In their article on conditional bias in the estimation of IQ declines, Veiel & Koopman (2001) consider estimation of cognitive decline. A pre-event IQ 1 is estimated from other available data (e.g., years of formal education completed, mean IQ for individuals with the same occupation as the examinee). Typically, a multiple linear regression formula is applied to such variables to estimate the pre-event IQ (e.g., Barona, Reynolds, & Chastain, 1984) .
Veiel and Koopman make two main points in their article. To appreciate their first point, recall that pre-event IQs may be estimated with both systematic and random errors. Systematic errors include population-wide under-or overestimation as well as what Veiel and Koopman call conditional bias. The latter occurs when subpopulations of examinees, all having the same true pre-event IQ, have their pre-event IQs misestimated by the same amount; the amount differs between such subpopulations. (This is a direct consequence of regression to the mean.) Random errors include measurement error and errors of prediction.
Veiel and Koopman's first, and quite correct, point is that an overall unbiased regression formula can show bias for subclasses of examinees having a common true pre-event IQ. They also point out that such biases can be sizeable. Their Figure 1 graphically demonstrates this phenomenon. Examinees at the extremes of the pre-event IQ distribution show more regression and hence more conditional bias than do those near the mean.
Veiel and Koopman's second and controversial point is that the usual estimator should not be used in court, because its conditional bias will lead to unjust results. They recommend instead a new formula, which they present. Their new formula, intended to remove the regression-induced conditional bias, works-it has np conditional bias. However, before practitioners rush to adopt Veiel and Koopman's new estimator, they must consider two problems with the argument in its favor. First, the new formula has much larger estimation error variance than does the usual regression estimator, and it lacks other desirable properties of an estimator. Second, Veiel and Koopman's attack on the use of the regression estimator in court argues illicitly from the premise of (conditional) statistical bias to a conclusion of injustice (unfairness or legal bias). Veiel and Koopman (2001) admit their estimator has larger estimation errors than does the usual formula: "The removal of bias in regression estimates comes with a price, namely a substantial increase in the standard error of estimate" (p. 364). However, readers may not fully realize the significance of this admission. It is just one of several ways in which their new estimator is statistically inferior to the usual regression formula.
Statistical properties of the usual regression estimator and Veiel and Koopman's adjusted estimator are readily derived.
2 In what follows, "bias" without qualifier means the usual statistical concept of (overall) bias. When I refer to conditional bias, I do so explicitly.
Let x denote an examinee's vector of scores on IQ-predicting variables (including a dummy variable for the intercept). Additionally, b denotes a vector of unstandardized regression coefficients. Let y denote the IQ score that would have been obtained if it had been measured prior to the alleged damaging event. The IQ test has reliability p (Lord & Novick, 1968) . Pre-event IQ is modeled by linear regression:
so that y, = x'b is the usual regression estimator and e u its error of prediction. Denote the population value of the squared correlation between y and y by R 2 . The proposed estimator, denoted by y = (1 -p//? 2 )/j, + yp/R 2 , comes from the linear model:
where /x is the mean of y in the population from which the examinee is sampled, and e a is the error of prediction for this adjusted estimator. The second line re-expresses the first in terms that allow comparing its error of estimate, e a , with the corresponding error for the usual estimator, e u .
Here are the properties of the usual estimator, y. It is unbiased. In fact, y is the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE) of y. That is, among unbiased estimators that are linear functions of the observations (this class includes both y and y), y has the smallest possible variance, regardless of parameter values. This is true, in fact, regardless of whether the distributions of y p y e , and e u are Gaussian. If it so happens that classical test theory true score, y p measurement error, y e , and error of estimation, e u , are Gaussian, then y is the unique maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) of y. That is, y gives that estimate of y which, if it were the true value, would make the observed data (on the IQ-predicting variables) most probable.
Because p. is the expected value of y t and y adjusts y symmetrically around ju,, y is also unbiased. However, y cannot be BLUE (or else y would not be best linear unbiased). Hence, y must have larger error variance than y, at least for some parameter values, whereas y cannot have larger error variance for any parameter values. Also, y is not an MLE because the MLE, namely y, is unique.
This shows that y estimates y with more (squared) error than does y, but it does not show how much more. In practice, it will usually be a lot more. The ratio of sampling variances, or efficiency of y relative to the best linear unbiased estimator y, turns out to be
For the authors' own example using the Barona et al. (1984) formula, p = .95 and R 2 = .6 2 , approximately; hence, the efficiency is just shy of 0.4. That is, Veiel and Koopman's estimator has 2.5 times as much (squared) error as the regression estimator.
Suppose these estimators of pre-event IQ are subtracted from current IQ to obtain estimates of cognitive decline, in a population of examinees without any true decline. Using the same numerical values as given earlier, the probability that the inferred decline will exceed 15 points is calculated to be about .11 for the usual estimator and .22 for Veiel and Koopman's estimator. This demonstrates the general principle: using an estimator with less (conditional or unconditional) systematic error can lead to such an increase in random error that overall accuracy suffers. In this case, error would double.
Conceptual Issues
Rather than argue for a trade-off between conditional bias (where their estimator is superior) and precision (where the usual estimator wins), Veiel and Koopman (2001) want to all but ban use of the ordinary estimator in court: Some [conditional] bias may be tolerable when the goal is to give information ... or to suggest the first in a series of... steps that can easily be modified. However, much of the estimation of premorbid intelligence by psychologists occurs in the context of litigation ... where the goal is to make final, "just" decisions and where one party's gain is the other's loss.... By using regression-based estimates of premorbid intelligence and not revealing their [conditional] bias, [the] expert witness ... deceives the decision-maker, (p. 357).
I have two comments on this passage. First, it unfortunately suggests that the expert has a bias, whereas the bias is the estimator's. Second, the passage misleadingly omits the critical adjective conditional in describing the bias of the usual estimator. The effect of this omission, which occurs repeatedly in the article, is to encourage confusion between bias, which the usual estimator does not have, and conditional bias, which it does.
Veiel and Koopman argue that use of the usual, conditionally biased estimator will lead to legal bias in the sense of unfairness. There are two key steps in the argument: a move from the unconditional long-run properties of an estimator to considerations of fairness in the individual case, and a move from statistical bias to legal bias (or unfairness). Both steps are fallacious.
There are two problems with the step from population-wide estimator properties (where the usual estimator shines) to casespecific properties (where Veiel and Koopman argue that bias or fairness considerations prevent use of the usual estimator). First, error in the instant case is avoided, by using the new estimator as compared with the usual one, not deterministically (i.e., certainly) but only probabilistically. This is because conditional bias is a long-run property of an estimator, just as are unconditional bias and estimation error variance. If one wants to argue that only errors in the instant case matter (i.e., aggregate error rates are irrelevant) then conditional bias is just as moot as precision. Indeed, such an idiographic view of error will offer scant basis for defending one estimator over another, a formula over an expert's intuitions, or an expert's opinion over a layperson's.
A second problem with the focus on single-case errors (or fairness) is that Veiel and Koopman consider the bias in the individual case (actually, the bias in cases with the same pre-event IQ), but they do not weigh the cost of expected random errors against this. They only look at half the picture. For example, they are grudgingly willing to countenance the use of the usual regression estimator in court, but only if its conditional bias is disclosed. However, they make no similar call for users of their proposed estimator to disclose its noteworthy lack of precision (as demonstrated above).
Veiel and Koopman's other key step, from statistical bias to legal unfairness, is I believe based on a seductive semantic asso-elation of the word bias, in its technical statistical sense, and the legal concept of bias. However, these are not even approximately the same. Statistical bias refers to a difference between the expected value of an estimator and its estimand. Black's Law Dictionary (Garner, 1999) defines "bias" as "... a predisposition to decide a cause or an issue in a certain way, which does not leave the mind perfectly open to conviction. .. . Condition of mind which sways judgment and renders judge unable to exercise his functions impartially in a particular case...." As far as I can see, these two concepts have little or no logical overlap. Certainly, Veiel and Koopman have not cited empirical evidence (e.g., from mock jury studies) showing that use of a conditionally biased estimator tends to produce decisions that are reasonably and objectively characterized as unjust.
